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Hoffmeister in Italy 
J .L. Granatstein 
This article is excerpted from Granatstein's The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the 
Second World War and is published with permission of the author and Stoddart Publishers, Toronto. The author 
expresses his gratitude to Dr. Bill McAndrew and Lieutenant-Colonel J.A. English for their assistance which will be 
evident in this article. 
Chris Vokes, commanding the 1st Canadian Infantry 
Division's 2 Brigade in which the 
Seaforth Highlanders served, had 
heard about Major B.M. 
Hoffmeister. "There is no such 
thing as a bom soldier," Vokes 
was told, "but he is the next best 
thing to it. He takes to soldiering 
like a duck to water." Vokes 
wanted Hoffmeister to take over 
the Seaforths, and he had 
arranged it. 1 The regiment was 
not in good shape when 
Hoffmeister returned from the 
Canadian Junior War Staff course 
in Kingston, Ontario, in October 
1942. Vokes told him it was now the worst 
battalion of the three in the brigade, and he 
wanted them to be the best. 2 There were 
problems with some of the senior officers, 
morale and discipline had slipped among the 
rank and file and, Hoffmeister believed, 
"damned bad leadership and administration" 
were to blame. He stepped in, made changes in 
personnel, began to send officers and NCOs on 
courses, and stepped up the pace of training. 
Morale improved dramatically, proving the 
adage that troops who are worked hardest are 
happiest. And his brigade and division 
commanders thought highly of Hoffmeister. 
Major-General Harry Salmon, the General 
Officer Commanding (GOC), recommended him 
for promotion (though ranking him fourth on a 
list of four behind Foulkes, Vokes and Kitching), 
citing his "ability to think clearly 
and quickly. Good leadership 
qualities. Will make a good G 
staff [operations] officer and with 
more experience a bde. com d. "3 
Staff College had prepared 
Hoffmeister for battle, and when 
the 1st Division was detailed for 
the operations in Sicily, Hoffy's 
men, for so the Seaforths now 
thought of themselves, were 
ready. 
Aboard ship en route to the 
Mediterranean, the CO assured 
that he went to each and every 
platoon in the regiment to brief 
them on the coming assault. As Hoffmeister 
said, they were his friends- he used to row in 
Vancouver with one of the sergeants, for 
example. And while he knew other battalion 
commanders didn't do this kind of all ranks' 
briefing, he cherished the thought that the 
men looked on him as a friend. Of course, that 
would require him to stick his neck out in 
action, to show himself, or else morale would 
fall. But he was prepared for this because he 
realized that unless he understood the 
conditions the soldiers had to face, the 
Seaforths' confidence in him could waver. A 
man of powerful personality and striking 
magnetism, Hoffmeister was the classic leader, 
someone that men wanted to follow. In all 
likelihood, they would have followed him if he 
had not briefed them so well; taken into his 
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Mqjor General B.M. Hoffmeister briefing officers of the 
5th Canadian Armoured Division prior to the advance 
on the Hitler Line, 13 May 1944. 
(Photo by Strathy Smith/NAC PA 189922) 
confidence, however, knowing his mind and 
their place in the plans, the Seaforths were 
ready for anything. There was nothing new in 
this Hoffmeister approach, nothing innovative. 
His was the classic technique of "man 
management" as taught to officers, the approved 
method of securing the "willing compliance" 
necessary to make soldiers risk their lives; 
unfortunately, it was all too often neglected by 
less conscientious and less sensible officers. 
The worth of Hoffmeister's approach was 
shown in action. The Seaforths fought their 
way through the rugged countryside with "fire, 
movement and plenty of guts," taking casualties 
but learning quickly and besting the Germans. 
Hoffmeister himself narrowly escaped death 
near Leonforte when four Canadian artillery 
shells fell short and exploded near the spot he 
was giving his orders on 21 July 1943. There 
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were 30 casualties, but Hoffmeister escaped 
unscathed, though severely shaken. 4 The next 
month, Hoffmeister led his regiment in a 
succession of attacks against Nazi positions 
north of the Salsa River. The attack on the 
enemy's 3rd Parachute Regiment north of 
Carcaci on 5 August, staged in conjunction 
with tanks of the Three Rivers Regiment. was 
deemed "amodelinfantry-cum-tankaction"by 
Major-General Guy Simonds, the GOC, who 
watched the battle from a vantage point on a 
nearby hilltop. So it was, for Hoffmeister rode 
in the armoured regiment commander's tank 
and thus kept control of the action. The paras 
fought "to the last man and the last round," 
and the Seaforths in this one action lost 11 
killed and 32 wounded. 5 
Hoffmeister and his regiment had proven 
themselves in action. Simonds, however, was 
not Hoffmeister's favourite commander, then 
or later. The GOC's concept of man 
management was not Hoffmeister's. Simonds 
was too cold-blooded. His orders were issued 
in an abrupt manner, his plans being snapped 
out, the session ending in a way that almost 
forbade comment. Simonds offered few pats 
on the back and, in Hoffmeister's view, made 
no effort to see or understand the problems of 
the battalion commander and his men. 6 
And his initiation to battle in Sicily had 
confirmed Hoffmeister in his view of Permanent 
Force (PF) officers. They were often too old and 
too fat and some drank too much, he said. The 
PF "protective net" that surrounded them could 
sometimes be hard to take. One brigadier, in 
whom he had no confidence, would later be 
forced upon him, the Canadian corps 
commander telling Hoffmeister, by then a 
division commander, that he was a PFer and 
had to be given his chance. There was also 
pressure to award decorations to PF senior 
officers who, he believed, did not deserve them. 7 
Hoffmeister merited his decorations, and 
he won the first of his three DSOs in Sicily. 
(There was an apocryphal story that his batman 
was recommended for the Victoria Cross simply 
for following Hoffmeister around!) It was not 
long before he was promoted to brigadier. On 
1 November 1943, the 1st Canadian Infantry 
Division now fighting on the Italian mainland, 
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Vokes became a major-general and GOC in 
place of Simonds who took the 5th Canadian 
Armoured Division, then en route to Italy. To 
replace Vokes, Hoffmeister got the nod. He had 
been recommended by Simonds and General 
Bernard Montgomery, the Eighth Army 
commander, for a brigade command in 
September and, though the initial intent back 
at Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) in 
London was to give him a brigade in Britain, 
the First Canadian Army's GOC-in-C, General 
A.G.L. McNaughton, decided he should have 2 
Brigade in 1st Division. 8 
In fact, Hoffmeister was already an acting 
brigadier, filling in for Vokes who had 
temporarily replaced Simonds on 29 September 
when the GOC was evacuated with jaundice. 
Vokes had found Hoffmeister at a brigade 
sports meet at Potenza and told him he was 
promoted. Following the same philosophy he 
had adopted more than two years before, 
Hoffmeister simply said "that's fine, I'll tum 
over [command of the Seaforths] immediately, 
pack up my stuff and be at your headquarters 
within an hour. "9 
Hoffmeister's initiation during the rapid 
advance of the division in the early days of the 
campaign on the mainland was not without its 
moments. His headquarters had lost touch 
with one ofhis battalions, the Princess Patricia's 
Canadian Light Infantry, and Hoffmeister and 
another officer drove forward to find them. "I 
couldn't see or hear a sound around any place. 
... Suddenly I looked over my shoulder and 
there was a German position up on a hill, an 
O[bservation] P[ost] obviously manned by four 
or five people. In those days," he went on, "I 
carried a rifle and tried to look like a private 
soldier," a sensible way of not being singled out 
by the enemy. Then Hoffmeister spotted a line 
of panzers, found some of his missing Patricias, 
and used their wireless to call up his own 
armour. Getting away soon turned into a 
series of mad dashes as he and the other officer 
took turns running and going to ground, chased 
by tank gunfire. "I saw the Patricias the next 
day," Hoffmeister's companion on this 
adventure wrote later, "and heard how they sat 
up on the hill and laughed at the spectacle of 
the Brigade Commander . . . doing hundred 
yard dashes between the shellbursts .... "10 
If that affair had its slightly comic side, the 
battle for Ortona around Christmas 1943 had 
none. A small fishing port on the Adriatic 
about halfway up the Italian peninsula, Ortona 
had little strategic significance in and of itself, 
but it was strongly held by the Germans and 
the Canadians had been ordered to take the 
town. To advance from the Mara River, 5 kms 
south of Ortona, to the Riccio River, 4 kms 
north of the town, took a month and cost 
heavily in casualties- 253 officers and 3,703 
men by the GOC's estimate at the time 11 - or 
almost half the fighting strength of the Division's 
infantry when the battle began in the second 
week of December 1943. 
For Hoffmeister's 2 Brigade, orders to take 
Ortona were orders. In his recollection, as in 
that of everyone who was there, it was "a 
desperate struggle" even to reach the town, so 
strongly were the rugged approaches defended; 
then the battle in Ortona itself involved the 
troops in house-to-house fighting as they 
mouseholed their way from one connected 
dwelling into the next. So vicious was the 
battle that Vokes, alarmed at the decimation of 
his infantry, asked Hoffmeister if he wanted to 
quit. By this time, the Brigadier believed that 
his troops were making progress against the 
German paratroopers and said "absolutely not, 
to quit at this time would be letting the brigade 
down and the effect on the morale of the 
brigade would be such that it would be just 
shocking." 12 That may have been true, though 
the impact of the slaughter at Ortona left the 
bruised survivors reeling. Moreover, perhaps 
Vokes' tactics were not appropriate, some 
historians commenting that the division's 
attacks faltered because they lacked weight, 
often being launched by single battalions. The 
terrain also could have lent itself to the 
bypassing of the town, thus sparing 
Hoffmeister's brigade much of the terrible 
difficulty it experienced. "But Vokes, for all his 
bluster," historian Brereton Greenhous 
commented, "was never a man for daring or 
momentum. Or for small leaps of logic. So he 
sent his long-suffering 2 Brigade to take the 
town." 13 Take it they eventually did after the 
world press painted the fight as "Stalingrad in 
Italy," the Nazis pulling out finally over the 
night of 27-28 December. 
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Hoffmeister's reward for the capture of 
Ortona came in March 1944 when he was 
promoted to major-general and given command 
of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division which 
had arrived in Italy before the new year and 
had had both Simonds and General E.L.M. 
Burns as its GOCs in the intervening month. 
Hoffmeister had won the job on merit, but it 
had not hurt that he was a militiaman. The 
Defence Minister, Colonel J.L. Ralston, made 
that clear when he wrote to Lieutenant -General 
Ken Stuart at CMHQ: 
Comparing Hoffmeister and [Brigadier T.G.] Gibson 
both impressed me as excellent. Hoffmeister more 
magnetic personality. IfHoffmeister reasonably equal 
in tactical ability would think his personality and the 
fact that he would give representation on divisional 
level to the N.P.A.M. [Non-Permanent Active Militia] 
might warrant giving him the call .... 14 
Crerar, the Corps commander in Italy, and 
Burns, his designated successor, agreed 15 and 
so did the British. General Sir Oliver Leese, 
commanding the Eighth Army, thought 
"Brigadier Hochmeister" "excellent," "a grand 
chap full of fight," a commander of"immense 
drive" who "is turning out [to be] a very good 
Armoured Divisional Commander." 16 
Hoffmeister himself learned of his promotion 
when Harry Crerar, who had summoned him 
to meet him at a bridge, asked "How would you 
like to command 5 Armoured?" "Very much. 
When can I start?" "Well, you're a cool one, 
aren't you?" 17 He was indeed, and his rise from 
battalion to division commander without any 
intervening period of staff employment was 
Major General B.M. Hq[fmeister. GOC Fifth Armoured 
Division, in Sherman Command tank "Vancouver." 
After the battle of the Gothic Line, 31 Augu...-,;t 1944, 
during which the Headquarters troop of the 9th Ar-
moured Regiment (British Columbia Dragoons) was 
wiped out. "Vancouver" was presented to the regi-
ment by Hoffmeister. It was renamed "Dragoon II" 
and was the command tank of the regiment until the 
end of the war. (CFPU 33253) 
certainly unprecedented in the Canadian Army 
in the Second World War. 
The 5th Canadian Armoured Division had 
only two brigades at this point, one armoured 
and one infantry. Hoffmeister ran it just as he 
had run his battalion and his brigade. He won 
over his senior officers very quickly by, for 
example, telling Brigadier J. Desmond B. Smith, 
the commander of the 5th Canadian Armoured 
Brigade, that he knew "bugger all" about 
handling armour and asking for his help. 18 
With the troops, he exerted his personality and 
showed himself. The 11th Canadian Infantry 
Brigade, his other brigade, had suffered a 
bloody repulse in a daylight attack on the Arieli 
River in January, and the troops still had not 
recovered their morale. The new GOC visited 
each unit, inspected their quarters, and 
demanded improvements where necessary. He 
made it clear to the officers that their 
responsibilities included looking after their 
men, and morale began to rise. It literally 
soared after Hoffmeister organized divisional 
exercises to demonstrate the tremendous array 
of weaponry that the division had. "The punch, 
the clout this division had was just 
tremendous," he said, "and no person, private 
soldier, NCO, or officer could fail to be impressed 
by this." His exercises including teaching the 
infantry how to advance behind artillery fire 
Hoffmeister personally took every infantry 
company in turn to show them how to lean into 
the barrage. This was always a calculated risk, 
and when the inevitable round fell short on one 
such demonstration, he remembered the 
infantrymen looking at him: "What do you say 
now, wise guy?" 19 
But one of his battalions, the Perth 
Regiment, a unit that had been hard-hit on the 
Arieli, was not responding and seemed so 
sullen and unresponsive as to be close to 
mutiny. Neither the brigade commander nor 
the battalion commander could suggest how to 
deal with the difiiculty so Hoffmeister arranged 
for two men from each platoon to meet with 
him with no other officers or NCOs present. 
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... I explained to the men exactly what the problem 
was, and the danger of going into battle with this lack 
of confidence and the poor morale that existed ... 
and (said] that we were going to stay there until I had 
answers. I said "I don't have the names of any of you 
men and I don't want to know your names; nothing 
you say here is being recorded, this is for my 
information ... only, so that I in turn may take the 
necessary action to get this unit in shape to fight." So 
we sat there and looked at each other, not a word was 
said and this went on, it seemed, like a long time ... 
. Finally a bit of dialogue started to develop and we 
worked this around by question and answer to the 
point where four officers were named as having 
performed badly in the Arieli thing ... [and] the men 
had absolutely no confidence in them and were 
reluctant to go into battle with them. This was the 
reason for the low morale. . . . I dismissed the 
meeting. went back to my HQ, called in the brigade 
commander and battalion commander and ordered 
him to dispose of these officers to the holding unit 
forthwith. 20 
This was not the usual general's way of dealing 
with unit morale, but it worked, and the Perths 
became a very good fighting regiment. 
How was it that Hoffmeister knew how to 
deal with such problems? Part of the answer 
was instinctive in the man, a simple sense of 
understanding how soldiers thought and 
reacted and how they wanted their officers to 
treat them. But it was also that only six 
months earlier he had been commanding a rifle 
battalion in action, and hence he understood 
what one could and could not do. As a brigadier 
and as a major-general, however, he knew that 
he could no longer influence events on the 
battlefield by seizing a rifle and joining the fray. 
Now as a GOC he had to stand back and find 
different ways to motivate soldiers, battalions, 
and staffs. To his credit, he found the ways, 
and he was one of the very few senior officers 
in the Canadian army who thought seriously 
and systematically about such problems, one 
of the few who did not simply rely on the 
authority conveyed by his rank to get his way. 
Hoffmeister led as well as commanded.21 
The beginnings of Hoffmeister's impact on 
his division became apparent in its first major 
action. When II Canadian Corps attacked the 
Hitler Line in the Liri Valley on May 23, the plan 
called for the 5th Armoured, now beginning to 
think of itself as "Hoffy's Mighty Maroon 
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Machine," after its coloured divisional arm 
patch, to pour through a gap in the line opened 
by the 1st Canadian Division. The plan worked 
well, though not without heavy fighting, 
casualties, and delays, and the armoured 
division drove through the hard-won breach 
with great panache. For Hoffmeister's 
headquarters staff, the only problem caused 
by their GOC was his habit of going forward too 
far and too often. Useful as that could be and 
necessary as it was for Hoffmeister to see what 
opposition he was sending his men to meet, it 
put him out of touch and left the staff to fight 
the battle. That caused difficulties. 22 There 
were worse ones. Unfortunately, the Eighth 
Army's planners had clogged the limited road 
network in the valley with too much traffic and 
horrendous jams resulted that slowed the 
pursuit as the Nazis retreated toward the north. 
General Burns, the Canadian corps 
commander, received the blame, and there 
was a natural tendency to look elsewhere for 
scapegoats. Hoffmeister's division took its 
share of the rap, his headquarters making the 
Corps staff very angry: "It is a hopeless task to 
try and get anything out of HQ 5 Cdn Div," 
Brigadier Nick McCarter, the BGS (Brigadier, 
General Staff), wrote in his personal diary. 
"They are behaving like complete amateurs." 
Worse, the division was using routes designated 
for other units. 23 Then, the commander of 11th 
Brigade, T.E.D'O. Snow, a PF officer, had to be 
pushed to exercise command of his troops in 
action, something that angered and disturbed 
Hoffmeister. For his part Snow, who was 
replaced in the next month, also wrote very 
critically ofthe division headquarters' conduct 
of the operation. 24 The problems aside, the 5th 
Armoured had performed well in its first major 
operation, 25 and Hoffmeister too had learned 
much. Certainly Burns was pleased. As he 
wrote privately, "Bert Hoffmeister did an 
excellent job and fought his green division with 
all the drive we expected of him."26 
Hoffmeister's 5th Armoured fought its next 
major battle on the Nazis' Gothic Line that 
protected northern Italy and the Po Valley. The 
Canadian Corps was to attack the Adriatic 
hinge of the line, and the date for a massive set-
piece attack was fixed for the night of 1-2 
September 1944. But initial patrol reports on 
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the night of 29-30 August suggested 
a strange lack of German activity, 
and the Corps headquarters decided 
to move against the enemy on 30 
August. Hoffmeister's division now 
had been strengthened with an 
additional brigade of infantry, and 
his battalions once more struggled to 
open a hole in the line for the tanks. 
Although the reports were confused 
and confusing, Hoffmeister made the 
"gutsy decision" to commit his 
armoured brigade at onceP By this 
time his staffs work was first-rate, 
Hoffmeister sought advice and took 
it, and the change in the meticulously-
prepared plan was implemented 
without difficulty. 28 After fierce 
fighting, the Germans, one division in 
danger of encirclement, began to pull 
back on September l. There was 
much more fighting before the line 
was cleared, but Hoffmeister's 
courageous seizure of the initiative 
had helped greatly to win the battle. 
Oliver Leese fairly bubbled when he 
told Montgomery that "The troops 
Canadian soldiers examine a map of the Italian Peninsula. (NAC) 
fought very well, especially the 5th Cdn Armd 
Div. This Div, led by Bert Hoffmeister, has the 
terrific dash of 7th Armd [the British Army's 
famous Desert Rats] in the old days. They have 
really done extremelywell."29 More concretely, 
Leese told Hoffmeister that he had earned a 
vacation and gave him his personal aircraft to 
take him to Cairo.30 Lieutenant-Colonel Jack 
English, a severe critic of Canadian army 
training and operations, agreed with the Eighth 
Army Commander's assessment. The 5th 
Canadian Armoured Division's operations on 
the Gothic Line, he said, "may have been the 
finest by any Canadian formation in the Second 
World War."31 Praise from English is praise 
indeed. 
Now in his mid -eighties and ill, Hoffmeister 
remains a commanding presence in his 
wheelchair. His eyes still fill with tears when 
he talks about men stopping him on the street 
to say proudly they had served under him. 
That, he says, was all the thanks he every 
wanted. 32 
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